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Abstract. We state the problem of inverse reinforcement learning in
terms of preference elicitation, resulting in a principled (Bayesian) sta-
tistical formulation. This generalises previous work on Bayesian inverse
reinforcement learning and allows us to obtain a posterior distribution
on the agent’s preferences, policy and optionally, the obtained reward
sequence, from observations. We examine the relation of the resulting
approach to other statistical methods for inverse reinforcement learning
via analysis and experimental results. We show that preferences can be
determined accurately, even if the observed agent’s policy is sub-optimal
with respect to its own preferences. In that case, significantly improved
policies with respect to the agent’s preferences are obtained, compared to
both other methods and to the performance of the demonstrated policy.
Key words: Inverse reinforcement learning, preference elicitation, de-
cision theory, Bayesian inference
1 Introduction
Preference elicitation is a well-known problem in statistical decision theory [10].
The goal is to determine, whether a given decision maker prefers some events to
other events, and if so, by how much. The first main assumption is that there
exists a partial ordering among events, indicating relative preferences. Then
the corresponding problem is to determine which events are preferred to which
others. The second main assumption is the expected utility hypothesis. This
posits that if we can assign a numerical utility to each event, such that events
with larger utilities are preferred, then the decision maker’s preferred choice from
a set of possible gambles will be the gamble with the highest expected utility. The
corresponding problem is to determine the numerical utilities for a given decision
maker.
Preference elicitation is also of relevance to cognitive science and behavioural
psychology, e.g. for determining rewards implicit in behaviour [19] where a proper
elicitation procedure may allow one to reach more robust experimental conclu-
sions. There are also direct practical applications, such as user modelling for
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determining customer preferences [3]. Finally, by analysing the apparent prefer-
ences of an expert while performing a particular task, we may be able to discover
behaviours that match or even surpass the performance of the expert [1] in the
very same task.
This paper uses the formal setting of preference elicitation to determine the
preferences of an agent acting within a discrete-time stochastic environment. We
assume that the agent obtains a sequence of (hidden to us) rewards from the en-
vironment and that its preferences have a functional form related to the rewards.
We also suppose that the agent is acting nearly optimally (in a manner to be
made more rigorous later) with respect to its preferences. Armed with this infor-
mation, and observations from the agent’s interaction with the environment, we
can determine the agent’s preferences and policy in a Bayesian framework. This
allows us to generalise previous Bayesian approaches to inverse reinforcement
learning.
In order to do so, we define a structured prior on reward functions and
policies. We then derive two different Markov chain procedures for preference
elicitation. The result of the inference is used to obtain policies that are signifi-
cantly improved with respect to the true preferences of the observed agent. We
show that this can be achieved even with fairly generic sampling approaches.
Numerous other inverse reinforcement learning approaches exist [1, 18, 20,
21]. Our main contribution is to provide a clear Bayesian formulation of inverse
reinforcement learning as preference elicitation, with a structured prior on the
agent’s utilities and policies. This generalises the approach of Ramachandran
and Amir [18] and paves the way to principled procedures for determining dis-
tributions on reward functions, policies and reward sequences. Performance-wise,
we show that the policies obtained through our methodology easily surpass the
agent’s actual policy with respect to its own utility. Furthermore, we obtain
policies that are significantly better than those obtained with other inverse re-
inforcement learning methods that we compare against.
Finally, the relation to experimental design for preference elicitation (see [3]
for example) must be pointed out. Although this is a very interesting planning
problem, in this paper we do not deal with active preference elicitation. We
focus on the sub-problem of estimating preferences given a particular observed
behaviour in a given environment and use decision theoretic formalisms to derive
efficient procedures for inverse reinforcement learning.
This paper is organised as follows. The next section formalises the prefer-
ence elicitation setting and relates it to inverse reinforcement learning. Section 3
presents the abstract statistical model used for estimating the agent’s prefer-
ences. Section 4 describes a model and inference procedure for joint estimation
of the agent’s preferences and its policy. Section 5 discusses related work in more
detail. Section 6 presents comparative experiments, which quantitatively exam-
ine the quality of the solutions in terms of both preference elicitation and the
estimation of improved policies, concluding with a view to further extensions.
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2 Formalisation of the problem
We separate the agent’s preferences (which are unknown to us) from the environ-
ment’s dynamics (which we consider known). More specifically, the environment
is a controlled Markov process ν = (S,A, T ), with state space S, action space
A, and transition kernel T = { τ(· | s, a) : s ∈ S, a ∈ A}, indexed in S ×A such
that τ(· | s, a) is a probability measure3 on S. The dynamics of the environment
are Markovian: If at time t the environment is in state st ∈ S and the agent
performs action at ∈ A, then the next state st+1 is drawn with a probability
independent of previous states and actions:
Pν(st+1 ∈ S | st, at) = τ(S | st, at), S ⊂ S, (2.1)
where we use the convention st ≡ s1, . . . , st and at ≡ a1, . . . , at to represent
sequences of variables.
In our setting, we have observed the agent acting in the environment and
obtain a sequence of actions and a sequence of states:
D , (aT , sT ), aT ≡ a1, . . . , aT , sT ≡ s1, . . . , sT .
The agent has an unknown utility function, Ut, according to which it selects
actions, which we wish to discover. Here, we assume that Ut has a structure cor-
responding to that of reinforcement learning infinite-horizon discounted reward
problems and that the agent tries to maximise the expected utility.
Assumption 1 The agent’s utility at time t is the total γ-discounted return
from time t:
Ut ,
∞∑
k=t
γkrk, (2.2)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a discount factor, and the reward rt is given by the (stochastic)
reward function ρ so that rt | st = s, at = a ∼ ρ(· | s, a), (s, a) ∈ S ×A.
This choice establishes correspondence with the standard reinforcement learning
setting.4 The controlled Markov process and the utility define a Markov decision
process [16] (MDP), denoted by µ = (S,A, T , ρ, γ). The agent uses some policy
pi to select actions with distribution pi(at | st), which together with the Markov
decision process µ defines a Markov chain on the sequence of states, such that:
Pµ,pi(st+1 ∈ S | st) =
∫
A
τ(S | a, st) dpi(a | st), (2.3)
3 We assume the measurability of all sets with respect to some appropriate σ-algebra.
4 In our framework, this is only one of the many possible assumptions regarding the
form of the utility function. As an alternative example, consider an agent who collects
gold coins in a maze with traps, and with a utility equal to the logarithm of the
number of coins if it exists the maze, and zero otherwise.
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where we use a subscript to denote that the probability is taken with respect
to the process defined jointly by µ, pi. We shall use this notational convention
throughout this paper. Similarly, the expected utility of a policy pi is denoted by
Eµ,pi Ut. We also introduce the family ofQ-value functions
{
Qpiµ : µ ∈M, pi ∈ P
}
,
where M is a set of MDPs, with Qpiµ : S ×A → R such that:
Qpiµ(s, a) , Eµ,pi (Ut | st = s, at = a) . (2.4)
Finally, we use Q∗µ to denote the optimal Q-value function for an MDP µ, such
that:
Q∗µ(s, a) = sup
pi∈P
Qpiµ(s, a), ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A. (2.5)
With a slight abuse of notation, we shall use Qρ when we only need to distinguish
between different reward functions ρ, as long as the remaining components of µ
remain fixed.
Loosely speaking, our problem is to estimate the reward function ρ and dis-
count factor γ that the agent uses, given the observations sT , aT and some prior
beliefs. As shall be seen in the sequel, this task is easier with additional assump-
tions on the structural form of the policy pi. We derive two sampling algorithms.
The first estimates a joint posterior distribution on the policy and reward func-
tion, while the second also estimates a distribution on the sequence of rewards
that the agent obtains. We then show how to use those estimates in order to
obtain a policy that can perform significantly better than that of the agent’s
original policy with respect to the agent’s true preferences.
3 The statistical model
In the simplest version of the problem, we assume that γ, ν are known and we
only estimate the reward function, given some prior over reward functions and
policies. This assumption can be easily relaxed, via an additional prior on the
discount factor γ and CMP ν. Let R be a space of reward functions ρ and P
to be a space of policies pi. We define a (prior) probability measure ξ(· | ν) on
R such that for any B ⊂ R, ξ(B | ν) corresponds to our prior belief that the
reward function is in B. Finally, for any reward function ρ ∈ R, we define a
conditional probability measure ψ(· | ρ, ν) on the space of policies P. Let ρa, pia
denote the agent’s true reward function and policy respectively. The joint prior
on reward functions and policies is denoted by:
φ(P,R | ν) ,
∫
R
ψ(P | ρ, ν) dξ(ρ | ν), P ⊂ P, R ⊂ R, (3.1)
such that φ(· | ν) is a probability measure on R × P. We define two models,
depicted in Figure 1. The basic model, shown in Figure 1(a), is defined as follows:
ρ ∼ ξ(· | ν), pi | ρa = ρ ∼ ψ(· | ρ, ν),
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(b) Reward-augmented model
Fig. 1. Graphical model, with reward priors ξ and policy priors ψ, while ρ and pi
are the reward and policy, where we observe the demonstration D. Dark colours
denote observed variables and light denote latent variables. The implicit depen-
dencies on ν are omitted for clarity.
We also introduce a reward-augmented model, where we explicitly model the
rewards obtained by the agent, as shown in Figure 1(b):
ρ ∼ ξ(· | ν), pi | ρa = ρ ∼ ψ(· | ρ, ν), rt | ρa = ρ, st = s, at = a ∼ ρ(· | s, a).
For the moment we shall leave the exact functional form of the prior on the
reward functions and the conditional prior on the policy unspecified. Neverthe-
less, the structure allows us to state the following:
Lemma 1. For a prior of the form specified in (3.1), and given a controlled
Markov process ν and observed state and action sequences sT , aT , where the
actions are drawn from a reactive policy pi, the posterior measure on reward
functions is:
ξ(B|sT , aT , ν) =
∫
B
∫
P pi(a
T |sT ) dψ(pi|ρ, ν) dξ(ρ|ν)∫
R
∫
P pi(a
T |sT ) dψ(pi|ρ, ν) dξ(ρ|ν) , (3.2)
where pi(aT | sT ) = ∏Tt=1 pi(at|st).
Proof. Conditioning on the observations sT , aT via Bayes’ theorem, we obtain
the conditional measure:
ξ(B | sT , aT , ν) =
∫
B
ψ(sT , aT | ρ, ν) dξ(ρ | ν)∫
R ψ(s
T , aT | ρ, ν) dξ(ρ | ν) , (3.3)
where ψ(sT , aT | ρ, ν) , ∫P Pν,pi(sT , aT ) dψ(pi | ρ, ν) is a marginal likelihood
term. It is easy to see via induction that:
Pν,pi(sT , aT ) =
T∏
t=1
pi(at | st)τ(st | at−1, st−1), (3.4)
where τ(s1 | a0, s0) = τ(s1) is the initial state distribution. Thus, the reward
function posterior is proportional to:∫
B
∫
P
T∏
t=1
pi(at|st)τ(st|at−1, st−1) dψ(pi|ρ, ν) dξ(ρ|ν).
Note that the τ(st|at−1, st−1) terms can be taken out of the integral. Since they
also appear in the denominator, the state transition terms cancel out. uunionsq
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4 Estimation
While it is entirely possible to assume that the agent’s policy is optimal with
respect to its utility (as is done for example in [1]), our analysis can be made
more interesting by assuming otherwise. One simple idea is to restrict the policy
space to stationary soft-max policies:
piη(at | st) =
exp(ηQ∗µ(st, at))∑
a exp(ηQ
∗
µ(st, a))
, (4.1)
where we assumed a finite action set for simplicity. Then we can define a prior on
policies, given a reward function, by specifying a prior on the inverse temperature
η, such that given the reward function and η, the policy is uniquely determined.5
For the chosen prior (4.1), inference can be performed using standard Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods [5]. If we can estimate the reward function
well enough, we may be able to obtain policies that surpass the performance of
the original policy pia with respect to the agent’s reward function ρa.
Algorithm 1 MH: Direct Metropolis-Hastings sampling from the joint distri-
bution φ(pi, ρ | aT , sT ).
1: for k = 1, . . . do
2: ρ˜ ∼ ξ(ρ | ν).
3: η˜ ∼ Gamma(ζ, θ)
4: p˜i = Softmax (ρ˜, η˜, τ)
5: p˜ = Pν,p˜i(sT , aT )/[ξ(ρ | ν)fGamma(η˜; ζ, θ)].
6: w.p. min
{
1, p˜/p(k−1)
}
do
7: pi(k) = p˜i, η(k) = η˜, ρ(k) = ρ˜, p(k) = p˜.
8: else
9: pi(k) = pi(k−1), η(k) = η(k−1), ρ(k) = ρ(k−1), p(k) = p(k−1).
10: done
11: end for
4.1 The basic model: A Metropolis-Hastings procedure
Estimation in the basic model (Fig. 1(a)) can be performed via a Metropolis-
Hastings (MH) procedure. Recall that performing MH to sample from some
distribution with density f(x) using a proposal distribution with conditional
density g(x˜ | x), has the form:
x(k+1) =
{
x˜, w.p. min
{
1,
f(x˜)/g(x˜|x(k))
f(x(k))/g(x(k)|x˜)
}
x(k), otherwise.
5 Our framework’s generality allows any functional form relating the agent’s pref-
erences and policies. As an example, we could define a prior distribution over the
-optimality of the chosen policy, without limiting ourselves to soft-max forms. This
would of course change the details of the estimation procedure.
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In our case, x = (ρ, pi) and f(x) = φ(ρ, pi | sT , aT , ν).6 We use independent
proposals g(x) = φ(ρ, pi|ν). As φ(ρ, pi|sT , aT , ν) = φ(sT , aT |ρ, pi, ν)φ(ρ, pi)/φ(sT , aT ),
it follows that:
φ(ρ˜, p˜i | sT , aT , ν)
φ(ρ, pi | sT , aT , ν) =
Pν,p˜i(sT , aT )φ(ρ˜, p˜i | ν)
Pν,pi(k)(sT , aT )φ(ρ(k), pi(k) | ν)
.
This gives rise to the sampling procedure described in Alg. 1, which uses a
gamma prior for the temperature.
4.2 The augmented model: A hybrid Gibbs procedure
The augmented model (Fig. 1(b)) enables an alternative, a two-stage hybrid
Gibbs sampler, described in Alg. 2. This conditions alternatively on a reward
sequence sample rT(k) and on a reward function sample ρ(k) at the k-th iteration
of the chain. Thus, we also obtain a posterior distribution on reward sequences.
This sampler is of particular utility when the reward function prior is conju-
gate to the reward distribution, in which case: (i) The reward sequence sample
can be easily obtained and (ii) the reward function prior can be conditioned on
the reward sequence with a simple sufficient statistic. While, sampling from the
reward function posterior continues to require MH, the resulting hybrid Gibbs
sampler remains a valid procedure [5], which may give better results than spec-
ifying arbitrary proposals for pure MH sampling.
As previously mentioned, the Gibbs procedure also results in a distribution
over the reward sequences observed by the agent. On the one hand, this could
be valuable in applications where the reward sequence is the main quantity
of interest. On the other hand, this has the disadvantage of making a strong
assumption about the distribution from which rewards are drawn.
Algorithm 2 G-MH: Two stage Gibbs sampler with an MH step
1: for k = 1, . . . do
2: ρ˜ ∼ ξ(ρ | rT(k−1), ν).
3: η˜ ∼ Gamma(ζ, θ)
4: p˜i = Softmax (ρ˜, ˜, τ)
5: p˜ = Pν,p˜i(sT , aT )/[ξ(ρ | ν)fGamma(η˜; ζ, θ)].
6: w.p. min
{
1, p˜/p(k−1)
}
do
7: pi(k) = p˜i, η(k) = η˜, ρ(k) = ρ˜, p(k) = p˜.
8: else
9: pi(k) = pi(k−1), η(k) = η(k−1), ρ(k) = ρ(k−1), p(k) = p(k−1).
10: done
11: rT(k) | sT , aT ∼ ρT(k)(sT , aT )
12: end for
6 Here we abuse notation, using φ(ρ, pi | ·) to denote the density or probability function
with respect to a Lebesgue or counting measure associated with the probability
measure φ(B | ·) on subsets of R×P
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5 Related work
5.1 Preference elicitation in user modelling
Preference elicitation has attracted a lot of attention in the field of user mod-
elling and online advertising, where two main problems exist. The first is how to
model the (uncertain) preferences of a large number of users. The second is the
problem of optimal experiment design [see 7, ch. 14] to maximise the expected
value of information through queries. Some recent models include: Braziunas and
Boutilier [4] who introduced modelling of generalised additive utilities; Chu and
Ghahramani [6], who proposed a Gaussian process prior over preferences, given a
set of instances and pairwise relations, with applications to multiclass classifica-
tion; Bonilla et al. [2], who generalised it to multiple users; [13], which proposed
an additively decomposable multi-attribute utility model. Experimental design
is usually performed by approximating the intractable optimal solution [3, 7].
5.2 Inverse reinforcement learning
As discussed in the introduction, the problems of inverse reinforcement learning
and apprenticeship learning involve an agent acting in a dynamic environment.
This makes the modelling problem different to that of user modelling where
preferences are between static choices. Secondly, the goal is not only to determine
the preferences of the agent, but also to find a policy that would be at least as
good that of the agent with respect to the agent’s own preferences.7 Finally, the
problem of experiment design does not necessarily arise, as we do not assume to
have an influence over the agent’s environment.
Linear programming One interesting solution proposed by [14] is to use a
linear program in order to find a reward function that maximises the gap between
the best and second best action. Although elegant, this approach suffers from
some drawbacks. (a) A good estimate of the optimal policy must be given. This
may be hard in cases where the demonstrating agent does not visit all of the
states frequently. (b) In some pathological MDPs, there is no such gap. For
example it could be that for any action a, there exists some other action a′ with
equal value in every state.
Policy walk Our framework can be seen as a generalisation of the Bayesian
approach considered in [18], which does not employ a structured prior on the re-
wards and policies. In fact, they implicitly define the joint posterior over rewards
and policies as:
φ(pi, ρ | sT , aT , ν) = exp
[
η
∑
tQ
∗
µ(st, at)
]
ξ(ρ | ν)
φ(sT , aT | ν) ,
7 Interestingly, this can also be seen as the goal of preference elicitation when applied
to multiclass classification [see 6, for example].
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which implies that the exponential term corresponds to ξ(sT , aT , pi | ρ). This
ad hoc choice is probably the weakest point in this approach.8 Rearranging, we
write the denominator as:
ξ(sT , aT | ν) =
∫
R×P
ξ(sT , aT | pi, ρ, ν) dξ(ρ, pi | ν), (5.1)
which is still not computable, but we can employ a Metropolis-Hastings step
using ξ(ρ | ν) as a proposal distribution, and an acceptance probability of:
ξ(pi, ρ | sT , aT )/ξ(ρ)
ξ(pi′, ρ′ | sT , aT )/ξ(ρ′) =
exp[η
∑
tQ
pi
ρ (st, at)]
exp[η
∑
tQ
pi′
ρ′ (st, at)]
.
We note that in [18], the authors employ a different sampling procedure than
a straightforward MH, called a policy grid walk. In exploratory experiments,
where we examined the performance of the authors’ original method [17], we
have determined that MH is sufficient and that the most crucial factor for this
particular method was its initialisation: as will be also be seen in Sec. 6, we only
obtained a small, but consistent, improvement upon the initial reward function.
The maximum entropy approach. A maximum entropy approach is re-
ported in [22]. Given a feature function Φ : S × A → Rn, and a set of trajecto-
ries
{
sTk(k), a
Tk
(k) : k = 1, . . . , n
}
, they obtain features ΦTk(k) =
(
Φ(si,(k), ai,(k))
)Tk
i=1
.
They show that given empirical constraints Eθ,ν ΦTk = EˆΦTk , where EˆΦT =
1
n
∑n
k=1 Φ
Tk
(k) is the empirical feature expectation, one can obtain a maximum
entropy distribution for actions of the form Pθ(at | st) ∝ eθ′Φ(st,at). If Φ is the
identity, then θ can be seen as a scaled state-action value function.
In general, maximum entropy approaches have good minimax guarantees [12].
Consequently, the estimated policy is guaranteed to be close to the agent’s.
However, at best, by bounding the error in the policy, one obtains a two-sided
high probability bound on the relative loss. Thus, one is almost certain to perform
neither much better, nor much worse that the demonstrator.
Game theoretic approach An interesting game theoretic approach was sug-
gested by [20] for apprenticeship learning. This also only requires statistics of
observed features, similarly to the maximum entropy approach. The main idea is
to find the solution to a game matrix with a number of rows equal to the num-
ber of possible policies, which, although large, can be solved efficiently by an
exponential weighting algorithm. The method is particularly notable for being
(as far as we are aware of) the only one with a high-probability upper bound on
the loss relative to the demonstrating agent and no corresponding lower bound.
8 Although, as mentioned in [18], such a choice could be justifiable through a max-
imum entropy argument, we note that the maximum-entropy based approach re-
ported in [22] does not employ the value function in that way.
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Thus, this method may in principle lead to a significant improvement over the
demonstrator. Unfortunately, as far as we are aware of, sufficient conditions for
this to occur are not known at the moment. In more recent work [21], the au-
thors have also made an interesting link between the error of a classifier trying
to imitate the expert’s behaviour and the performance of the imitating policy,
when the demonstrator is nearly optimal.
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Fig. 2. Total loss ` with respect to the optimal policy, as a function of the inverse
temperature η of the softmax policy of the demonstrator for (a) the Random
MDP and (b) the Random Maze tasks, averaged over 100 runs. The shaded areas
indicate the 80% percentile region, while the error bars the standard error.
6 Experiments
6.1 Domains
We compare the proposed algorithms on two different domains, namely on ran-
dom MDPs and random maze tasks. The Random MDP task is a discrete-state
MDP, with four actions, such that each leads to a different, but possibly overlap-
ping, quarter of the state set.9 The reward function is drawn from a Beta-product
hyperprior with parameters αi and βi, where the index i is over all state-action
9 The transition matrix of the MDPs was chosen so that the MDP was communicating
(c.f. [16]) and so that each individual action from any state results in a transition
to approximately a quarter of all available states (with the destination states ar-
rival probabilities being uniformly selected and the non-destination states arrival
probabilities being set to zero).
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pairs. This defines a distribution over the parameters pi of the Bernoulli dis-
tribution determining the probability of the agent of obtaining a reward when
carrying out an action a in a particular state s.
For the Random Maze tasks we constructed planar grid mazes of different
sizes, with four actions at each state, in which the agent has a probability of 0.7
to succeed with the current action and is otherwise moved to one of the adjacent
states randomly. These mazes are also randomly generated, with the rewards
function being drawn from the same prior. The maze structure is sampled by
randomly filling a grid with walls through a product-Bernoulli distribution with
parameter 1/4, and then rejecting any mazes with a number of obstacles higher
than |S|/4.
6.2 Algorithms, priors and parameters
We compared our methodology, using the basic (MH) and the augmented (G-
MH) model, to three previous approaches. The linear programming (LP) based
approach [14], the game-theoretic approach (MWAL) [20] and finally, the Bayesian
inverse reinforcement learning method (PW) suggested in [18]. In all cases, each
demonstration was a T -long trajectory sT , aT , provided by a demonstrator em-
ploying a softmax policy with respect to the optimal value function.
All algorithms have some parameters that must be selected. Since our method-
ology employs MCMC the sampling parameters must be chosen so that conver-
gence is ensured. We found that 104 samples from the chain were sufficient, for
both the MH and hybrid Gibbs (G-MH) sampler, with 2000 steps used as burn-
in, for both tasks. In both cases, we used a gamma prior Gamma(1, 1) for the
inverse temperature parameter η and a product-beta prior Beta|S|(1, 1) for the
reward function. Since the beta is conjugate to the Bernoulli, this is what we
used for the reward sequence sampling in the G-MH sampler. Accordingly, the
conditioning performed in step 11 of G-MH is closed-form.
For PW, we used a MH sampler seeded with the solution found by [14], as
suggested by [17] and by our own preliminary experiments. Other initialisations,
such as sampling from the prior, generally produced worse results. In addition,
we did not find any improvement by discretising the sampling space. We also
verified that the same number of samples used in our case was also sufficient for
this method to converge.
The linear-programming (LP) based inverse reinforcement learning algo-
rithm by Ng and Russell [14] requires the actual agent policy as input. For
the random MDP domain, we used the maximum likelihood estimate. For the
maze domain, we used a Laplace-smoothed estimate (a product-Dirichlet prior
with parameters equal to 1) instead, as this was more stable.
Finally, we examined the MWAL algorithm of Syed and Schapire [20]. This
requires the cumulative discounted feature expectation as input, for appropri-
ately defined features. Since we had discrete environments, we used the state oc-
cupancy as a feature. The feature expectations can be calculated empirically, but
we obtained better performance by first computeing the transition probabilities
of the Markov chain induced by the maximum likelihood (or Laplace-smoothed)
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policy and then calculating the expectation of these features given this chain.
We set all accuracy parameters of this algorithm to 10−3, which was sufficient
for a robust behaviour.
6.3 Performance measure
In order to measure performance, we plot the L1 loss
10 of the value function of
each policy relative to the optimal policy with respect to the agent’s utility:
`(pi) ,
∑
s∈S
V ∗µ (s)− V piµ (s), (6.1)
where V ∗µ (s) , maxaQ∗µ(s, a) and V piµ (s) , Epi Qpiµ(s, a).
In all cases, we average over 100 experiments on an equal number of ran-
domly generated environments µ1, µ2, . . .. For the i-th experiment, we generate
a T -step-long demonstration Di = (s
T , aT ) via an agent employing a softmax
policy. The same demonstration is used across all methods to reduce variance.
In addition to the empirical mean of the loss, we use shaded regions to show
80% percentile across trials and error bars to display the standard error.
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Fig. 3. Total loss ` with respect to the optimal policy, in the Random MDP
task. Figure 3(a) shows how performance improves as a function of the length
T . of the demonstrated sequence. Figure 3(b) shows the effect of the number
of states |S| of the underlying MDP. All quantities are averaged over 100 runs.
The shaded areas indicate the 80% percentile region, while the error bars the
standard error.
10 This loss can be seen as a scaled version of the expected loss under a uniform state
distribution and is a bound on the L∞ loss. The other natural choice of the optimal
policy stationary state distribution is problematic for non-ergodic MDPs.
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6.4 Results
We consider the loss of five different policies. The first, soft, is the policy of
the demonstrating agent itself. The second, MH, is the Metropolis-Hastings
procedure defined in Alg. 1, while G-MH is the hybrid Gibbs procedure from
Alg. 2. We also consider the loss of our implementations of Linear Programming
(LP), Policy Walk (PW), and MWAL, as summarised in Sec. 5.
We first examined the loss of greedy policies,11 derived from the estimated
reward function, as the demonstrating agent becomes greedier. Figure 2 shows
results for the two different domains. It is easy to see that the MH sampler sig-
nificantly outperforms the demonstrator, even when the latter is near-optimal.
While the hybrid Gibbs sampler’s performance lies between that of the demon-
strator and the MH sampler, it also estimates a distribution over reward se-
quences as a side-effect. Thus, it could be of further value where estimation of
reward sequences is important. We observed that the performance of the baseline
methods is generally inferior, though nevertheless the MWAL algorithm tracks
the demonstrator’s performance closely.
This suboptimal performance of the baseline methods in the Random MDP
setting cannot be attributed to poor estimation of the demonstrated policy, as
can clearly be seen in Figure 3(a), which shows the loss of the greedy policy
derived from each method as the amount of data increases. While the proposed
samplers improve significantly as observations accumulate, this effect is smaller
in the baseline methods we compared against. As a final test, we plot the relative
loss in the Random MDP as the number of states increases in Figure 3(b). We
can see that the relative performance of methods is invariant to the size of the
state space for this problem.
Overall, we observed the basic model (MH) consistently outperforms12 the
agent in all settings. The augmented model (G-MH), while sometimes outper-
forming the demonstrator, is not as consistent. Presumably, this is due to the
joint estimation of the reward sequence. Finally, the other methods under con-
sideration on average do not improve upon the initial policy and can be, in a
large number of cases, significantly worse. For the linear programming inverse
RL method, perhaps this can be attributed to implicit assumptions about the
MDP and the optimality of the given policy. For the policy walk inverse RL
method, our belief is that its suboptimal performance is due to the very re-
strictive prior it uses. Finally, the performance of the game theoretic approach
is slightly disappointing. Although it is much more robust than the other two
baseline approaches, it never outperforms the demonstrator, even thought tech-
nically this is possible. One possible explanation is that since this approach is
worst-case by construction, it results in overly conservative policies.
11 Experiments with non-greedy policies (not shown) produced generally worse results.
12 It was pointed out by the anonymous reviewers, that the loss we used may be biased.
Indeed, a metric defined over some other state distribution, could give different
rankings. However, after looking at the results carefully we determined that the
policies obtained via the MH sampler were strictly dominating.
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7 Discussion
We introduced a unified framework of preference elicitation and inverse reinforce-
ment learning, presented two statistical inference models, with two corresponding
sampling procedures for estimation. Our framework is flexible enough to allow
using alternative priors on the form of the policy and of the agent’s preferences,
although that would require adjusting the sampling procedures. In experiments,
we showed that for a particular choice of policy prior, closely corresponding to
previous approaches, our samplers can outperform not only other well-known
inverse reinforcement learning algorithms, but the demonstrating agent as well.
The simplest extension, which we have already alluded to, is the estimation of
the discount factor, for which we have obtained promising results in preliminary
experiments. A slightly harder generalisation occurs when the environment is
not known to us. This is not due to difficulties in inference, since in many cases
a posterior distribution overM is not hard to maintain (see for example [9, 15]).
However, computing the optimal policy given a belief over MDPs is harder [9],
even if we limit ourselves to stationary policies [11]. We would also like to consider
more types of preference and policy priors. Firstly, the use of spatial priors for the
reward function, which would be necessary for large or continuous environments.
Secondly, the use of alternative priors on the demonstrator’s policy.
The generality of the framework allows us to formulate different preference
elicitation problems than those directly tied to reinforcement learning. For ex-
ample, it is possible to estimate utilities that are not additive functions of some
latent rewards. This does not appear to be easily achievable through the exten-
sion of other inverse reinforcement learning algorithms. It would be interesting
to examine this in future work.
Another promising direction, which we have already investigated to some
degree [8], is to extend the framework to a fully hierarchical model, with a
hyperprior on reward functions. This would be particularly useful for modelling
a population of agents. Consequently, it would have direct applications on the
statistical analysis of behavioural experiments.
Finally, although in this paper we have not considered the problem of ex-
perimental design for preference elicitation (i.e. active preference elicitation), we
believe is a very interesting direction. In addition, it has many applications, such
as online advertising and the automated optimal design of behavioural exper-
iments. It is our opinion that a more effective preference elicitation procedure
such as the one presented in this paper is essential for the complex planning task
that experimental design is. Consequently, we hope that researchers in that area
will find our methods useful.
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